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Abstract This paper is a response to Lewis’ ‘Humean Supervenience Debugged’
(1994). Lewis was in the business of defending Humean Supervenience, and the project
seemed successful until the case of chance. Lewis thus originally named chance the
‘big bad bug’ for Humean Supervenience until the aforementioned paper in which he
claims victory. Here I argue that he was unsuccessful and that Humean Supervenience
remains bugged by chance. I will show how this bug remains due to a misdiagnosis of
where the problem lies with regard to undermining. First, I define Humean
Supervenience and chance, and state the bug in its original form, then secondly I
describe Lewis’ attempt to remove the bug. Thirdly, I explain why the bug persists,
despite Lewis’ efforts, and show the real source of the undermining problem to be due to
the circularity of Humean Supervenient style accounts of chance. Finally I describe the
situation this leaves chance in, and show how the incompatibility of chance and Humean
Supervenience is evidence for the nonexistence of chance. I conclude that it is the
circularity of the formation of Humean Supervenient laws of chance which continue to
bug Humean Supervenience, leaving it untenable and resulting in little chance for
chance.
Keywords David Lewis . Chance . Humean Supervenience . Undermining
Humean Supervenience and Chance
What Is Humean Supervenience?
Humean Supervenience (HS) is a contingent thesis that states that everything actual
supervenes on the subvenient base: there cannot be a difference in anything in the
world without a difference in the base. This subvenient base is the Humean mosaic,
which is the spatiotemporal distribution or arrangement of all particular matters of fact
(all of which have only perfectly natural properties). For Lewis it is certain that “truth is
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supervenient on being” (Lewis 1994 p473)1 in this Humean way. Since we are working
on the assumption that our world is chancy, the ‘truth’ and ‘everything actual’ includes
chance, so chance too must be Humean Supervenient by supervening on the subvenient
base. If chance does not supervene in this way then not everything is Humean
Supervenient, and HS fails.
What Is Chance?
For Lewis, chances are single case objective probabilities, and in a chancy world there
will be nontrivial nonextremal chances with probabilities between 0 and 1.2 Lewis
defines chance as being related to credence (the subjective degree of belief), in the way
described by his a priori Principal Principle (PP)3:
PP : Cr AjHtwTwð Þ ¼ Chtw Að Þ
The PP says that for all times t, worlds w and propositionsA, at time t in world w the chance
of A is equal to the reasonable initial credence in A conditional upon the total matters of
particular fact up until time t in world w and the complete theory of chance for world w.
4 The T
specifies this complete theory of chance for the subscripted world w, where the theory of
chance ismeant to be a collection of hypothetical information about the chances of events in
that world, in the form of history-to-chance conditionals: Htw → Chtw(A). The laws of
chance come from the complete theory of chance Tw so that particular matters of fact are
given chances from the conjunction of Htw with Tw. Lewis treats such a conjunction as
being admissible evidence with regard to A as he states that it will attempt to provide the
nontrivial nonextremal chance of A as opposed to whether A happens or not.5 Only
admissible evidence regarding A is permitted in the PP, to ensure that the principle
doesn’t tell us what actually happens in the future.6 So the PP relates two kinds of
probability, namely how rational credence in A conforms to the chance of A,
conditionalising on admissible evidence HtwTw.
1 As I am referring repeatedly to this text, future references will be given by page number only.
2 I will be assuming for the sake of argument that extremal chances will mean the occurrence or nonoccurence
of an event, such that 0 chance is to not occur, and having chance 1 is to occur. This has been worried over by
those such as Mellor (2006). For example it may not be that having 0 chance means nonoccurence in the
infinite case—in a finite sequence of events each of nonzero (say ½) chance of occurrence, the chance of them
all occurring is greater than zero, but in an infinite sequence of such events it turns out that ½ (for instance) to
the power of infinity is zero. But this may not mean that infinite sequences cannot occur. This will not
matter—see note 5.
3 This is a later and more important formulation called ‘the Principal Principle Reformulated’ (Lewis
(1980) p97) which I believe to be a clearer version to work with than the equivalent original formulation:
C(A/XE) = x where C is the initial reasonable credence, A is the thing in question, X is the proposition that the
chance of A is x, and E is the admissible evidence.
4 Lewis (1980) p98
5 For the notion of admissibility to have meaning and not be redundant there must be some values that turn out
to entail the occurrence/nonoccurrence of A (and the obvious candidates for these values are 1 and 0). Without
these extremal values having such significance there will never be inadmissible applications of the PP, as if
values 0 and 1 do not entail non-occurrence and occurrence then the principles never give information about
what happens in the world and as such will always be admissible. This is very problematic, and so I will be
treating chances of values 0 and 1 to have their standard entailment of nonoccurrence and occurrence.
6 This admissibility will be discussed further later in this paper, to the effect that HtwTw may turn out to be
regarded as inadmissible evidence relative to A, otherwise it will provide no information about A at all and
will thus be admissible at the cost of being useless and uninformative.
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What Is the Big Bad Bug?
Lewis identifies and originally rejectswhat he considers to be an exhaustive list ofmethods for
making chance Humean Supervenient. He thus names chance the ‘big bad bug’7 for HS, as if
chance is not Humean Supervenient then HS fails. He later concedes and endorses the
following method as successful:
Tw is contingent and chances are determined by the subvenient base.
This states that we should regard the theory of chance as contingent as opposed to
necessary, so that it is dependant on how the world is and could be different accordingly. It
further means that Tw is determined by the subvenient base, and as such the chances are
determined by the subvenient base also. The complete spatiotemporal arrangement of
particular matters of fact will provide the chances and determine Tw, therefore ensuring that
the laws of chance are contingent and that chance is Humean Supervenient. However, now
enters the problem of undermining. Undermining in itself is deemed merely and only
‘peculiar’ by Lewis: “This undermining is certainly very peculiar. But I think that, so far, it
is no worse than peculiar.” (p483) What is unacceptable for Lewis about undermining is the
fact that it is incompatible with the PP (in that the PP rules it out), and his original rejection of
this method is purely due to this conflict. I shall now explain undermining and how it conflicts
with the PP, and hope to motivate that it is problematic in itself rather than simply due to this
conflict with the PP.
What Is Undermining?
If chance supervenes on the subvenient base, then Tw is determined by the total subvenient
base. This means that the complete, actual arrangement of particular matters of fact over the
past, present and future will determine the chances for any other arrangement of particular
matters of fact. So, Tw is sensitive to the way things are not only in the history of a world w
before a time t (Htw) but also to the way things will be in the future of a world w after a time t.
The problem with this is that Tw (when combined with Htw) is said to provide us with the
positive chance for non-actual undermining futures (call these futures F*). But since F* does
not happen, it is not made up of particular matters of fact that are part of the subvenient base,
thus it is not a future that determines Tw (because Tw is determined by the actual past, present
and future).8 Tw would therefore be incompatible with F* since if F* were the actual future
then it would determine a different theory of chance T*w. Suppose Tw gives F* chance x, but
then this chance is realised and F* actually occurs, then T*w would be determined and T*w
would give F* chance y (where x ≠ y). It changes its own chance and makes the present
chance unstable.9 By determining a different theory of chance than the one that gives it its
7 Lewis (1986) pxiv
8 Lewis understands “it is because the chancemaking pattern lies partly in the future that we have some chance
of getting a future that would undermine present chances. This problem would go away if we could assume
that the chancemaking pattern lay entirely in the past” (p483) but Lewis rejects this method as it would make
Tw necessary which he argues is false/problematic.
9 Lewis notes: “Different alternative futures would determine different present chances… It’s not that if this
future came about, the truth about the present would change retrospectively. Rather it would never have been
what it actually is, and would always have been different.” (p482–3)
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chance, F* is said to undermine its own chances, and thus is called an undermining future. See
Fig. 1 below10:
This undermining feature is a result of combining HS and chance, and is
certainly disturbing in itself, but for Lewis it is only problematic due to its
incompatibility with PP which occurs since a contradiction is derived when F*
is plugged into PP:
LHSð Þ Cr F jHtwTw  ¼ Chtw Fð Þ RHSð Þ
0 ¼ 0 < x < 1
The LHS equals 0 by HtwTw being incompatible with F* as it is not part of
the subvenient base that makes up HtwTw,
11 and the RHS equals 0<x<1 by Tw
giving a positive chance to the possible future F* in a chancy world. Thus, a
contradiction.12
10 This diagram makes clear a parallel circularity problem to that of the paradox of time travel: If I were to
travel back in time, I could do something back in the time I travelled to which would then result in a different
future to that of the one I had travelled back from. The classic example of killing my grandfather makes the
paradox vivid—if now, in 2014, I travelled back to 1959 (the year before my mother was born) and killed my
grandfather before he and my grandmother had conceived my mother then my mother would not be born in
order to give birth to me, and thus there would be no year 2014 in which I exist in order to travel back to 1959
to kill my grandfather. So similarly here is a circularity that entails a form of undermining.
Tw
T*w
DIRECTION OF TIME NOW
F
chance y
F*
chance x
Fig. 1 Undermining
11 Thau notes: “It sounds a bit odd to say that the theory of chance [Tw] might rule out certain futures [F*]
which are nonetheless probabilistically possible, but only a bit odd.” (p495) This is along the same lines of
Lewis’ dismissal of undermining being merely (and not worse than) peculiar. Tw rules out F* by being
incompatible with it, yet gives it a positive chance. But to be given chance 0 may not be to be ruled out (see
note 2). However the contradiction remains as the LHS will still equal 0 (despite whether this means
nonoccurence) and the RHS will not equal 0. Furthermore F* will need to be ruled out as not occurring if
Tw is true, as that will mean F* cannot occur (because if Tw is true then F* didn’t occur), and chance 0 will
equal being ruled out.
12 A contradiction can also arise completely on the same side (LHS) of the PP. The LHS can be argued to
equal 0 (F* being incompatible with Tw) yet also Tw combined with Htw is meant to select the conditional
giving F* a positive chance and hence equals more than and not equal to 0. This neatly summarises the
circularity in Humean Supervenient laws of chance I am arguing for.
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Debugging Humean Supervenience
In order to rid of the conflict between the PP and undermining, Lewis makes a big
concession, namely he drops his once considered a priori “all there is to know about
chance”13 (Lewis 1980 p86) principle PP, and endorses a New Principle (NP) in place
of it to be the new actual definition of chance. He claims the NP will not experience the
undermining problem, simply by not being incompatible with it in the way the PP was
(by deriving a contradiction when F* was plugged into it). This is Lewis’ answer to
debugging HS (p487). The NP approximates PP and differs from the PP only with
regard to the conditional probability on the RHS:
PP : Cr AjHtwTwð Þ ¼ Chtw Að Þ
NP : Cr AjHtwTwð Þ ¼ Chtw AjTwð Þ
The NP states that reasonable initial credence in A should conform to the
chance of A conditional on the theory of chance Tw. The NP is said to be able
to accommodate undermining futures F* whereas the PP rules out undermining
(p483). Lewis states, “by conditionalising credence or chance on Tw, we ignore
undermining futures.” (p487) They are ignored because nothing is said of their
chance in the NP, only their conditional chance. Thus the fact that all F* have
a positive present chance is not mentioned in the NP and so ceases to be a
problem. Before, a contradiction arose from the PP when F* was plugged in.
Now, with the NP no such contradiction arises. This is because the RHS of the
NP is the conditional chance of F*, and this conditional chance is 0, not
between 0 and 1 as before. The conditional chance (in NP) of F* on Tw is 0
because F* (as an undermining future) is said to be incompatible with Tw,
whereas the unconditional chance (in PP) of F* is between 0 and 1 because Tw
gives F* a positive chance of occurring. Therefore the NP outputs 0 on both
LHS and RHS for undermining futures F* thus avoiding contradiction. This
completes Lewis’ purely technical cover-up solution as a method of debugging
HS:
Rebugging Humean Supervenience
In order to elucidate what I believe to be the real problem with undermining I will
evaluate the NP more closely. Studying the role of Tw in the NP will expose the proper
diagnosis of the undermining problem by showing that it is a problem due to the
13 He states that the PP will still be our working definition of chance, and that the NP will approximate the PP
to a near enough degree, so that even though the NP is strictly the true principle the PP will approximate this
closely enough to still be classed useful and a priori.
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formation of Tw (as opposed to due to an incompatibility with the PP), and as such the
NP is helpless in solving the problem. The incompatibility that bugs HS is not between
undermining and the PP, but between HS and chance (regardless of the principle in
use). Chance thus cannot be made Humean Supervenient, so either HS fails or there
will be no such thing as chance.
How Do We Understand the NP?
For the NP to solve the undermining problem we must be able to make sense of it.14
There are two options for how to interpret the conditionals in the NP:
(1) Treat the conditional on Tw as providing new information about A, such that it
reads ‘the chance of A given what Tw says about A’;
(2) Treat the conditional like a fraction where Tw itself has a chance, such that it reads
‘the chance of A conditional on the chance of Tw
′.
Therefore, the questions are: (1) what does Tw tell us of A; and (2) what is
the chance of Tw? I shall pursue these options in turn, arguing that their examination
reveals Lewis’ HS account of chance to be circular and so still very much
bugged.
Option 1: ‘The Chance of A Given What Tw Says About A’
Tw is the collection of hypothetical conditionals from possible histories to chance, so
for all histories, Tw has a conditional from that history to the chance of any proposition
A. So without information about the actual history Htw, Tw has many conditionals for
all the hypothetical histories which give different chances to A. Tw alone thus provides
us with nothing concerning the actual chance of A. Therefore, Chtw(A|Tw) interpreted
as ‘the chance of A given what Tw says about A’ has no value, as Tw provides many
possible values for the chance of A from various hypothetical histories but doesn’t
provide the actual value for the chance of A since the actual history Htw is not explicitly
supplied to pick out the right conditional from Tw. However, despite Htw not being
explicitly supplied, it is indeed implied, as the actual history of the world is somehow
stored in Tw as it is part of the subvenient base that formed Tw. So perhaps we would be
able to select the conditional from history-chance of A. However with that Humean
reasoning in mind, if the history could be somehow stored in Tw by being formed by a
mosaic that contains that history then the future too could likewise be stored, as Tw is
determined by the complete subvenient base that extends from the first moment in
history to the last moment in future, and thus such a mosaic is in some way contained in
Tw.
15 Tw would then be able, not to tell us the chance of A, but the actual occurrence or
14 Both Briggs (2009) and Hall (1994) comment on the problems of interpreting the conditional Chtw(A|Tw)
and argue that this quantity is not user-friendly and worse is not well-defined. If this is true then the NP is
rendered useless and unsuccessful in its function to debug HS.
15 Tw may be compatible with many mosaics, as the mapping from the arrangement of particular matters of
fact to the laws need not be one-one, but could be many-one. So it could be that not only will the actual mosaic
be somehow stored or compatible with Tw but also any mosaic that doesn’t contain in it an undermining event
which would produce a different T*w. See note 18.
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nonoccurrence of A, with regard to whether A was part of the pattern that determines,
and is thus stored in, Tw.
16
So, Tw is determined by the complete arrangement of particular matters of fact,
including the future which we have assumed is chancy. This now poses a further
problem for the role of Tw in telling us something about the chance of A—namely, if
the future particular matters of fact have not yet occurred then Tw is not yet determined.
17
Furthermore, if A concerned such a future event then by HS the facts wouldn’t have yet
attained in order to determine the laws Tw, so Tw will be neither compatible nor
incompatible with A (and thus wont be able to tell us about A—chance or occurrence)
since the future cannot somehow be stored in Tw as suggested above when the future
(which includes A) hasn’t happened yet. If the future is genuinely chancy (and has not
occurred yet) then Tw remains to be defined, so to consult Tw when seeking to know the
chance of future event A is pointless (because it is precisely such future events that
include Awhich contribute to forming Tw to then tell us the chance of A). So Tw for A is
undefined, as is Chtw(A|Tw), as Tw tells us nothing of A due to its being unformed. Since
Tw cannot provide a value for A to understand Chtw(A|Tw), we move on to option 2.
Option 2: ‘The Chance of A Conditional on the Chance of Tw’
We are now questioning the chance of Tw. Given HS, the laws supervene on particular
matters of fact throughout the whole world (past, present and future), and the future
particular matters of fact have chances thus conjunctions of these facts have chances,
therefore the laws which supervene on the conjunctions of particular matters of facts
must also have chances. The chance of Tw may then be considered undetermined, as
what determines Tw may not yet have obtained, and only once they have obtained can
Tw be formed, however by then Tw will equal 1. Tw will only have chance 1 if all the
particular matters of fact have chance 1. This is because all the particular matters of fact
need to occur (have chance 1) in order to define Tw (so that Tw has chance 1), otherwise
both the particular matters of fact and Tw will have a nonextremal chance and will be as
16 This would make Tw by itself inadmissible evidence, as to be admissible requires that it doesn’t say
anything about how things actually turn out. If Tw were to be inadmissible in this way, then both the PP and the
NP would never apply and would be regarded useless or incorrect. Lewis to some extent recognizes this aspect
of HS and the inadmissibility of HtwTw relative to undermining futures (in that HtwTw rules out F* by being
incompatible with it) and concedes to allow for degrees of admissibility so that HtwTw can qualify as being an
acceptable degree of admissible. It turns out though, that due to HS, Tw and HtwTw are always admissible by
saying nothing at all. Interestingly then the PP and NP are useless either way: if HtwTw is admissible by saying
nothing then they are completely uninformative, and if HtwTw is inadmissible then they cannot ever apply.
17 Thanks to John Horden for pointing out that the fact that the future is chancy and needs to be formed in order
to determine the laws Tw may not pose a problem for Lewis who holds the difficult combination of eternalism
with realism about chance. Under eternalism, the future will be as formed as the past, and so the complete
subvenient base will already somehow be there ready to determine Tw, evenwhen the future is chancy and hasn’t
happened yet. There seems to be a tension between this eternalist block universe view and its compatibility with
nonextremal objective (nonepistemic) chance, but I shall consider it here as a possible escape for Lewis. Lewis
would say the whole mosaic is out there, extending into the unforeseen future, regardless of what the chances
are. So Tw would be determinately true even though it has some present chance of being false (by the future
turning out differently having a positive chance). This is because being determinately true at a time and being
nomologically determined to be true at that time (having chance 1) are not the same, and as such Tw needn’t have
chance 1 to be formed. Yet for the purposes of this paper, my target is not Lewis specifically, but rather any
advocate of Humean chance. So unless every member of this target also endorses eternalism, there remains a
problem of Tw being undefined due to being formed in part by an unformed chancy future.
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uncertain as each other. We cannot give a value to the chances of particular matters of
fact A or to Tw because they are defined in a circular way—the chance of Tw depends
on the chance of all A and the chance of all A depend on Tw. This circularity prevents
Chtw(A|Tw) providing any value and renders the NP useless.
Lewis complains, however, that the PP allows for Tw to have a chance 1 only:
Replacing A with Tw in the PP: Cr(Tw|HtwTw) = Chtw(Tw)
Tw is obviously compatible with itself Tw, so LHS: Cr(Tw|HtwTw)=1
Since the LHS equals the RHS of the PP: Chtw(Tw)=1
The PP therefore gives the conclusion that the chance of Tw is 1.
This can also be formalised as a reductio ad absurdum argument:
Assuming for reductio that ~Tw has a positive chance: Chtw(~Tw) = (0<x<1)
~Tw is incompatible with Tw, so the LHS of the PP: Cr(~Tw|HtwTw) = (x=0)
Since the LHS = RHS: Cr(~Tw|HtwTw) = Chtw(~Tw), so (x=0)=(0<x<1)
Contradiction! The probability x cannot be both 0 and between 0 and 1.
Therefore, ~Tw cannot have a positive chance so Tw must have chance 1.
As Lewis claims, our theory of chance is one that “never had any chance of being
false.” (Lewis 1986 p84) But this cannot be correct, as when the chance of Tw is 1 then
Chtw(A) = Chtw(A|Tw), and this makes the NP and PP equivalent (which Lewis states is
not the case as they must only approximate each other when HS is true). So on the other
hand, if HS is true then the chance of Tw shouldn’t equal 1 as Tw will itself have a
chance, thus Chtw(A) ≠ Chtw(A|Tw) meaning the NP and PP are not equivalent.
Chtw(Tw) ≠ 1 is not only proved by HS, but also by our assumption of the world being
chancy, as stated byHaddock: “From the assumption that our theory of chance never had
any chance of being false, we’ve proved determinism; for any event Ai, our theory of
chance ascribes to that event a probability of 1… Thus, [Chtw(Tw)] does not equal 1.”
(Haddock 2011 p861–2, notation mine) Furthermore, we ought not look to the old PP
for confirmation of whether Tw has a chance but instead look to the NP, and, as Haddock
points out, on standard probability theory the conditional P(A|Tw) = P(A&Tw)/P(Tw),
which means Tw must have a probability/chance. So if Lewis wants Tw to not be chancy
then he must drop the NP, chance or HS as these all entail Tw must have a chance.
It could be contested that the laws cannot have a chance, such that any account of chance
that permits the laws of chance themselves to have a chance is implausible. Laws can’t really
have a chance, but they may have a subjective probability, like credence, assigned to them.
The laws (theory) of chance can’t have a chance, since they are meant to be laws governing
chance itself. How can the concept of chance apply to itself? One can ask, how likely is it
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that Tw is correct, but the answer to this is an epistemic chance—it’s what we know of
whether Tw is correct rather than an actual metaphysical chance that Tw has of actually being
correct. If chance is single case objective probabilities as Lewis states, then the laws cannot
have a chance since laws are not single case things, so the concept of objective probability
does not apply to laws. Theories of chance do not assign themselves probabilities as they are
not themselves events, and simply fall outside the field over which chance is defined.
However it is clear that under HS the laws will have a chance, namely a chance of
being correct (i.e. being the Tw that does describe the way things did in fact turn out, to
correctly reflect the subvenient base that determines it). It can thus be shown that
undermining bugs HS in another problematic form—it’s not just futures that are
undermining, but theories of chance too. There are many times t* where the complete
arrangement that makes up the total subvenient base is incomplete, in that the full future
may not have occurred yet. Thus at t* different future arrangements have a chance.
Because of this, there will also be a chance at t* for a different theory of chance T*w
since the theory of chance is determined by the total arrangement of particular matters
of fact and this arrangement has a chance of being different. Different arrangements
determine a different theory of chance, 18 and since different arrangements have a
chance then different theories of chance have a chance. If Tw itself is chancy, then
the chance distribution that Tw provides over particular matters of fact is chancy, thus
undermining Tw itself.
In order to avoid the circularity experienced from Tw being determined by a chancy
future (and thus itself being chancy), one could appeal to a different sense of chance to
provide a chance to the undetermined Tw, but this only leads to embarking on a regress.
This is because Tw is meant to govern chance, but if chance applies to Tw as well then this
chance needs to be governed by a higher order Tw
′ . To assign a chance to Tw being true the
higher order Tw
′ is needed to provide the chance of Tw, leading to a regress as such: Tw gives
a chance to A, then there is a higher order Tw
′ that gives a chance B to Tw giving the correct
chance to A, then there is a higher higher order Tw
′′ that gives a chance C to the chance B
being the correct chance of Tw giving the correct chance to A, etc. If there are two senses of
chance (one that the particular matters of fact have and one that the laws have) then this
18 Thanks to Paul Noordhof who noted there needn’t be a one-one mapping from arrangement-theory. It could be
that multiple/variable realisation is true, such that there could bemany different arrangements that all determine the
same theory Tw. This implies that ‘if A1 then Tw, or if A2 then Tw’ but not ‘if Tw then A1’. Tw doesn’t require that
one particular arrangement occurred over others supporting (roughly speaking) the same frequencies. To illustrate,
suppose that all future coin tosses have a 50 % chance of landing heads; and that this is just because throughout
history (past, present and future), half of the coin tosses land heads. Suppose there are 100 coin tosses in the whole
of history and that there have been 50 coin tosses so far, and 25 have landed heads. So there are 50 coin tosses yet to
come, and 25 will land heads—otherwise the relevant chances would be different. But clearly there are many
different ways in which there can be 25 heads out of 50 tosses. There could first be 25 heads, and then later 25 tails,
or vice versa, or alternating heads and tails, and so on. The order doesn’t affect the frequency, and by hypothesis the
frequency determines the relevant chances. And even if actual chances have a (more sophisticated) best-system
analysis of the sort advocated by Lewis, it still seems that, analogously, many different (but relevantly similar)
patterns in theHumeanmosaicwould determine the very same chances that we have in the actual world. This gives
Tw a certain degree of independence, loosening my circularity claim somewhat. However given that there still are
arrangements (presumably the majority of the possible arrangements) that will be undermining for Tw it still holds
that Tw has a chance of being incorrect. The chance of Tw is now just the chance that the future wont be
undermining. It is not the case that every nonactual future would determine the truth of a different theory of chance,
but there are still some (again presumablymost) that would. Given that they have a positive chance, andwhat gives
them this chance therefore has a chance of being incorrect, the circularity from the undermining problem remains,
as if there’s a chance of undermining in a theory then that theory has a chance of being incorrect.
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other sense would need to be governed 19 by yet a further sense of chance. Without
appealing to further higher order chances to govern the chance that laws have, we would
have to explain the chance that laws give and the chance that laws have in terms of each
other, making a circular account of chance. Either, then, the chances of Twwill be governed
by a higher order of chance (embarking on a regress) or will be defined and governed by its
own chance (becoming circular). Since neither of these options are appealing, chance is
rendered incompatible with HS. The dilemma of regress or circularity occurs for all
accounts of chance that maintain that the laws are contingent and determined by all
particular matters of fact, and as such this is not a problem only for the NP but for all
Humean (and frequency style) theories of chance.
To summarise, the two options we had for interpreting the conditional chance
Chtw(A|Tw) have proven to be unsuccessful, since the circular Tw entails that the
chances Tw gives and the chance Tw has are all indeterminate, resulting in the
conditional being undefined. The NP is thus useless, leaving HS bugged by chance
without a principle to cover it up. I will now revisit undermining to see what this
evaluation of the NP has revealed about the problem which fuelled the change of
principle, and see where the problem really lies and why it was not solved.
Undermining Revisited
Undermining was regarded as merely peculiar, and only became a problem for Lewis
due to its incompatibility with the PP.20 The NP was supposed to solve this by ignoring
the existence of undermining futures, avoiding the contradiction that the PP entailed.
However, due to HS, Tw is chancy because it is determined by the chancy subvenient
base, and thus neither the LHS Cr(F*|HtwTw) nor the RHS Chtw(F*|Tw) of the NP can
equal 0. Both sides are undefined. This is because if Tw is chancy (in that there is a
chance that it is not correct for world w) then there is a chance that F* is compatible
with HtwTw and Tw by being part of the mosaic that determines it. There’s a chance that
F* is part of the subvenient base that determines Tw and there’s a chance that F* is not.
There is thus a chance that Tw will be compatible with F* and a chance that Tw will not
be. Therefore, the NP doesn’t supply Cr(F*|HtwTw)=0 or Chtw(F*|Tw)=0, and so fails
in its technical solution to the undermining problem. This further shows that no
technical solution was required as there was no technical contradiction in the first
place: the PP for the same reasons as above doesn’t supply the contradictory
Cr(F*|HtwTw)=0 or Chtw(F*|Tw)=1. The undermining problem was thus never a
problem of incompatibility with the PP, but an incompatibility of chance with HS.
This ‘peculiar’ aspect of HS will remain as long as Tw is determined by a pattern that
extends into the chancy future. Any Humean Supervenient account of chance where Tw
19 Perhaps ‘govern’ is inaccurate, as a strict Humean/Lewisian does not regard laws as really governing events
but rather merely reflecting them. Under HS in a chancy world w the chance of A at t in w will be x simply
because the frequency of A-type events (in the circumstances of the type which hold at t in w) are those that
would make the Best System Analysis of Laws give chance x to A-type events as part of the best (simple,
informative and most fitting) description of the patterns of events which hold in the world w. So really the laws
just reflect and describe the frequencies. Nevertheless, since the frequencies have an overall chance of coming
about, the laws themselves have a chance to correctly reflect those frequencies or not, and so we must question
how we understand these chances that laws have, and I propose it is either circular or regressive.
20 I argue that undermining is much more severe than mere peculiarity, and occurs due to the circularity in all
contingent Humean Supervenient accounts of chance, which the NP can’t resolve.
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is contingent and determined by all matters of particular fact in the subvenient base that
covers the past, present, and future, will encounter undermining problems, regardless of
the credence-chance principle in use. This is a result of the circularity they experience—in
that Tw provides the chances for the particular matters of fact yet the chances of those very
same particular matters of fact determine Tw—so any chancy future will be undermining if it
is not a future that determines Tw since Tw dictates those futures chances. Thus the
contradiction with the PP was not the heart of the undermining problem. The real essence
of the undermining problem is the circular Tw, which is not solved by the concession to the
NP, and shows HS and chance to be incompatible. Lewis acknowledges the devastating
effects this may have for a successful account of chance: “The big bad bug bites a range of
different Humean analyses of chance. Simple frequentism falls in that range; so does the
Best System Analysis.” (p482) Thau (1994) makes a similar discovery, that this circularity
undermining problem is experienced by all frequency and ‘Justified Certainty’ theories.
Because of this it seems unlikely that there can be a successful analysis of chance, as
arguably the best accounts involve frequencies and the PP/NP. If we are to agree with this
that our best accounts of chance are Humean/Lewisian in style, then this result is all the
worse for chance.We thus are forced down one horn of a dilemma—stick with our Humean
style laws (and do away with objective chance), as we cannot keep chance and dispense of
HS as our best account of chance is Humean.
Conclusion
I have argued that HS remains bugged by chance, despite Lewis’ attempt to free it from the
undermining problem. I claimed that the real essence of this problemwent unnoticed, and it
was because of this failure of recognition that Lewis’ debugging failed. Undermining is
worse than peculiar, it is threatening to any account of chance, and so cannot be solved by
covering up the issue with a principle that ignores it. I showed the real essence of the
undermining problem to be due to Humean Supervenient laws of chance being circular:
what gives the laws a chance is what the laws give a chance to. This proper diagnosis of the
undermining problem shows the cause to be the circularity of HS laws of chance, and so it is
this formation of HS laws that need to be changed, not (as Lewis attempted) any credence-
chance principle. The incompatibility between HS, chance, and the original chance princi-
ple—the PP—cannot be removed by a change in chance principle (as Lewis attempts by
changing to the NP) as the real incompatibility exists simply between HS and chance.
Therefore it turns out that one must be dropped. HS is a thesis that ranges over everything
actual, and so if we are to insist that there are chances (and chose not to drop chance) then
HS will not be able to account for such chances. As such, HS will be left philosophically
untenable due to the bug of chance. I thus conclude that HS is rebugged by chance, leaving
HS untenable and potentially ruining our chance of having chance, thereforemaking Lewis’
project unsuccessful.21
21 I would like to thank Stephen Barker, Paul Noordhof, Barry Lee, John Horden and Dave Ingram for useful
discussion and comments relating to earlier drafts of this paper, and to the audiences of the Graduate
conference at the University of Stockholm and the Mind and Reason research group at the University of
York at which I presented versions of this paper.
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